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Literature and the evolution of religious discourse: 
A concluding essay 
John C. Hawley 
You know how to interpret the face of the earth 
and the sky. How is it you do not know how to 
interpret these times? (Luke 12:56) 
Religion and literature do not play identical roles in society, but they both 
rely heavily on imagination. This book has provided an examination of 
representative writings from both fields to demonstrate this fact, and to 
suggest points at which the differences between the two disciplines become 
less important. Viewed together, these examples. raise interesting questions 
regarding the viability of discussing enduring truths outside the realms of 
imagination. This paradox, in turn, points to the limitations of rationality · 
in the pursuit of such truths, and the inevitabili ty of subjectivity in the 
quest for the objectively true. 
These are important philosophical questions, but some readers will be 
more interested in the historical and sociological aspects of the topic. 
Some may characterize the trajectory trac~d by these chapters as an 
example of Arnold Toynbee's model for the collapse of a civilization -
the civilization in question here being western Christianity. The first six 
studies focus on the words of Scripture, especially as they were reflected 
upon in sermons to imagine the end of time, and to call the congregation 
to personal conversion: as it happens, all six chapters demonstrate the 
sense of crisis culminating in the Reformation. A return to the Word was 
seen to be the best and effective Response to the clarion Challenge heard 
throughout Europe (I here use Toynbee's vocabulary for the dialectical 
movement typical within civilizations). Subsequent chapters in this vol-
ume, however, use a similar vocabulary but take an increasingly secular 
tone. The movement in many is inward, a psychological self-analysis that 
yearns for conversion, as in the earlier chapters - but the desired move-
ment of soul is not forthcoming. By the time we reach the volume's closing 
chapters, the individualistic response has broadened: institutionalized re-
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ligion has become not only irrelevant, but a hindrance to self-understand-
ing and any hope for epiphany. In the place of religion, the scriptural 
Word conti nues to speak - but no longer with the commanding eloquence 
of unique revelation. W hat had formerly been accepted as sacred has 
become, for many contemporary writers, an unusually rich story from 
which one's own imagination can extrapolate - one tool, among others, 
for the modern prophet's idiosyncratic search. Validation of truth has 
moved away from the community. 
In Toynbee's scheme civilizations go into decline when they fa il to meet 
increasingly complex challenges, challenges that gradually become more 
spiritual in nature. Briefly put, they collapse not because of external 
problems, but because of inherent defects in their members and a lack of 
creative leadership (Nash 1969: 177). Is chis, in fact, what the Reformation 
and Counterreformation presaged, the petrified life-in-death described by 
Toynbee as a way-station between breakdown and dissolution? Many 
would say so; several of the contributors to this volume may be among 
them. Others, pointing to the promise Jesus made to bring not peace but 
the sword, may use the same data to draw ocher conclusions. Incompatible 
heuristics are the engine driving world religions; they exemplify the history 
of contention to which this volume's subtitle and Preface refer. Does this 
possible pattern suggest that religion is being replaced in society by an 
increasing pietism, or even gnosticism, among its members? 
In its Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World 
(Gaudium et Spes) participants in the Second Vatican Council humbly 
approached the hermeneutics involved in the search for meaning in history: 
"That the earthly and the heavenly city penetrate each other is a face 
accessible to faith alone. It remains a mystery of human history, which 
sin w ill keep in great disarray until the splendor of God's sons is fully 
revealed" (Abbott 1967: 239). It will come as no surprise that Karl Rahner, 
an architect of the Council, took the same faith-stance: 
... man's ·historicity stands in need of hea ling which is not to be 
looked for from the internal dynamism of history. So that it becomes 
clear that revelation alone brings man's historicity to itself by 
showing the genuine end of history to be the final consummation 
of history and the world in salvation ... as a theological term man's 
historicity means that man rema ins open to God's disposal in such 
a way char he may expect the salvation of himself, of his world and 
history from an historical and personal event. (Rahner 1983: 
209 - 210) 
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In less metaphysical language, Ernst Troeltsch notes that "the connection 
of religious belief with particular historical events is only mediate and 
relative" (Troeltsch 1991: 19); Jaroslav Pelikan holds much the same view: 
" ... defining the nature of the truth of revelation and identifying the locus 
of dogmatic authority are not problems that yield their resolutions to the 
research of the historian" (Pelikan 1971: 156). This is a relatively new 
understanding of the inherent limitations of religious assertion, 1 a rec-
ognition that the proper realm for such language is not the sa me as that 
of history or, at least, that its methodology cannot attain the same kind 
of certainty that the scientific methodology employed by history may wish 
to claim. As we have noted, literature has never made the sort of truth 
claims that the scientist does, and argues instead for different types of 
truth. 
Of course, the claims of the historian must be carefully tempered, as 
an increasing cohort of participants and observers have pointed out. 
Dennis Nineham, for example, notes that 
what any historian is concerned with is past events, but the modern 
historian emphasizes that once an event is past we can have no 
direct access to it or relationship with it. All we can have are data 
relating to it (Nineham 1977: 78) .. . the 'facts' as established by the 
historian can no more be identified with the original 'event' than 
the data can. An event is something which can never be compassed 
in its fullness even by those present when it occurs; and certainly 
no structure of words, whether those of the historian or his sources, 
can ever encompass an event. (Nineham 1977: 81) 
But this narrowing of the rules of evidence has resulted in confusion: an 
ever-more-regressive deconstruction of the truths we hold most dear. 
Nietzsche was one of the first blatantly to rejoice in this fact: 
What, then , is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and 
anthropomorphisms - in short, a sum of human relations, which 
have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and 
rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and 
obligatory to a people: truths are il lusions about which one has 
forgotten that this is what they are: metaphors which are worn out 
and without sensuous power.(Palsey 1978: 70) 
Nietzsche seems instinctively to use literary language to explain himself, 
and the analogy is a natural one. T.R. Wright notes that "modern literary 
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theory ... has emphasized the illusory nature of realism whi le recent 
historiography has stressed the fictiveness of history" (Wright 1988: 84). 
The philosophical assault to which Wright refers is applied specifically to 
history by Michel Foucault with the Schadenfreude we have come to 
associate with postmodernism: "We want historians to confirm our belief 
that the present rests upon profound intentions and immutable necessities. 
But the true historical sense confirms our existence among countless lost 
events, without a landmark or a point of reference" (Foucault 1977: 156 
- 157, cited in Wright 1988: 84) . The balloon is well- inflated, the wind 
is up, but the compass cannot find magnetic north. Where does this "drift" 
lead us today? 
An increased historical consciousness increases this disorientation. As 
Dennis Nineham remarks, " ... one century's understanding of an historical 
event never commends itself in its entirety to the historians of the next 
century ... " (Nincham 1977: 84). As the chapters of this book demonstrate, 
revisionist readings become especially pronounced in the study of the 
written and spoken word. The literary "canon" is put in question; the 
politics of publication interrogate the clarity of literary evaluation. "No 
classic text," in the view of David Tracy, 
comes to us without the plural and ambiguous history of effects of 
its own production and all its former receptions ... Historical ambi-
guity means that a once seemingly clear historical narrative of 
progressive Western enlightenment and emancipation has now be-
come a montage of classics and newspeak, of startling beauty and 
revolting cruelty, of partial emancipation and ever subtler forms of 
entrapment. (Tracy 1987: 69- 70) 
But the limitations of human understanding have been a donnee since 
Adam and Eve. Those who argue from a confessional framework situate 
this newly-humbled overview of history, with its "hermeneutics of suspi-
cion" (Ricoeur 1970: 32-36), within a posited teleology, a "salvation" 
history (Heilsgeschichte). Seeking to trace a line of significance threading 
its way through the accumulating details of time, writers like John Henry 
Newman, in his "An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine" 
(1845), describe parameters to discern both change and continuity in 
theological assertions over time. As Jaroslav Pelikan notes (1969: 12-37), 
any meaningful objectivity in Newman's proposed line of inquiry is fraught 
with difficulties. His criteria of "authenticity" in the historical develop-
ment of doctrine are the following: 1) the preservation of type or idea 
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(but this was objected to by Luther, Sebastian Franck, John Headley, 
Franklin Littell, G.J. H eering, and others); 2) continuity of principles 
(contested by Francois Guizot, Schleiermacher, and others}; 3) assimilative 
power (refuted by Harnack, Karl Holl, and others); 4) early anticipation 
(disputed by Martin Chemnitz and others); 5) logical sequence (objected 
to by Luther); 6) preservative additions (refuted by Franz Pieper); 7) 
chronic continuance (contested by Harnack and Gerhard Ebeling). Pelikan 
can affirm that "the fact of development of doctrine ... is beyond dispute" 
(Pelikan 1969: 41), but he remains convinced that parameters for discov-
ering a goal in such development, let alone discerning God's purposes in 
history, rely upon a confessional foundation. 2 
If the very facts upon which history is built are increasingly in question, 
the truth of traditional faith claims inevitably remains a bone of contention 
for many; the assertion that "faith informs understanding" does not satisfy 
some investigators. For someone like Troeltsch the distinction between 
the confessional and the scientific has too frequently been blurred. In his 
view, 
the theological investigations of recent centuries are replete with 
this special methodology geared to the history of salvation, which 
vitiates and distorts the methodology of secular history in various 
ways, and with distinctive Christian theories of knowledge suppos-
edly based either on the principle of ecclesiastical obedience or on 
regeneration and inner experience. (Troeltsch 1991: 23) 3 
In any case, the chapters of this book demonstrate the fact, and imply 
the process, of the development of the religious imagination, which some 
would describe as a development of doctrine. Harnack dismissed doctrinal 
continuity as bullheaded tenacity; in refuting this view, Pelikan suggests 
that Harnack missed the point. Pelikan notes that the change is organic 
(and fairly inevitable), not mechanical or planned: " it does not do so on 
the basis of the a priori logic prescribed by the theologian, but on the 
basis of an a posteriori logic to be described by the historia n" (Pelikan 
1969: 51). The result is not tidy. Doctrinal "continuity" cuts across 
institutional professions, in spite of intransigent statements to the contrary, 
and the religious imagination, however timeless its inspiration, cannot 
help but reflect its age - and its age's limitations. On the one hand, 
underlying the controversies of the sixteenth century were convictions 
upon which both sides agreed (the Virgin Birth, for example); but those 
agreements may now have been extrapolated beyond possible agreement 
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(the declaration of the Immaculate Conception in 1854 and of the As-
sumption in 1950, for example, have pushed the two "sides" apart) . On 
the other hand, Protestant Bible criticism has divided its own community 
but pushed Catholicism closer to it. The supposed continuity of doctrine 
often demands rather elaborate defence. Twentieth century Christians 
might ask themselves whether they identify more readily with the doctrines 
reflected in this book's early chapters, or with those in the latter half: 
believers imagine God differently now. 
If recent writers can be believed, many of the views of Troeltsch have 
now become acceptable across a wide doctrinal spectrum. One Jesuit, for 
example, concludes that one of the second Vatican Council's principal 
achievements was a "recognition" of history, with certain consequences 
in the Christian imagination: 
Firstly, the recognition of history and the location of faith within 
it, rather than alongside it or in opposition to it, meant a renewal 
of true historical memory rather than mere adaptation. Secondly, a 
respect for history makes it impossible to reduce diversity and 
plurality to certain universal formulae. Finally, no separation is 
possible between religious history and the history of the world at 
large. We can no longer use the categories which help to distinguish 
between the sacred and the profane. (Sheldrake 1991: 29) 
But removing the border between the sacred and the profane has 
disturbing consequences, to say the least. For some, like Wolhan Pannen-
berg, the apparent disenfranchisement is overcome by what would seem 
to be a sacralizing of the profane. Revelation, for him, "should not be 
limited to a special series of events cut off from the rest of history but 
include all history, which is not so much Hegel's 'self-revelation of the 
absolute' as a narrative interpretation of the significance of world-events" 
(Wright 1988: 90). The assumption would seem to be that objective Truth 
cannot be tied down to any comprehensive view of history, let alone to 
any especially pregnant moments in time, but meaning can nonetheless 
be, for lack of a better word, "realized" in the telling of a narrative that 
pieces parts of time together. For Ricoeur, Arthur Danto, Hayden White 
and others, meaning is conveyed only in the telling of, in the context of, 
a "story." 
If Pannenberg would allow us to extend his definition of revelation to 
the stories that have come under discussion in this volume, we would 
have to assert that they have been historicized attempts to recogn ize 
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meaning, not to invent it. As Stephen Crites writes, "people do not sit 
down on a cool afternoon and think themselves up a sacred story. They 
awaken to a sacred story, and their most significant mundane stories are 
told in the effort, never fully successful, to articulate it" (Crites 1971: 
295 - 296) . But if meaning is only demonstrated in the actual telling of 
stories, many of our contemporaries would protest that such subjective 
testimonials are hardly acceptable as unbiased evidence of Ultimate mean-
ing. In putting the case in these terms, we have moved beyond the strict 
categories of "the historical method" endorsed by Troeltsch and moved 
into the realm of hermeneutics and narratology. 4 Yet Troeltsch certainly 
imagined time as "storical," to coin a term: " ... unique forces also stand 
in a current and context comprehending the totality of events, where we 
see everything conditioned by everything else so that there is no point 
within history which is beyond this correlative involvement and mutual 
influence" (Troeltsch 1991: 14). No one historian can step beyond the web 
in which she or he lives, nor can anyone know everything related even to 
one given moment. His historical method inevitably selects the correlations 
and mutual influences it chooses to foreground as meaningful "glue." 
But Troeltsch makes no bones about his own faith commitment and 
how that shapes his own story: 
I would say that it is the essence of my view that it thoroughly 
combats historical relativism, which is the consequence of the his-
torical method only within an atheistic or a religiously skeptical 
framework. Moreover, my view seeks to overcome this relativism 
through the conception of history as a disclosure of the divine 
reason. (Troeltsch 1991: 270) 
"Divine reason"? What kind of historical method would allow such a 
concept, except one that recognized the importance of personal commit-
ment and assertion even in a transient world? Sounding much like Toyn-
bee, Troeltsch asserts that 
the point is that history is not a chaos but issues from unitary forces 
and aspires towards a unitary goal. For the believer in religion and 
ethics, history is an orderly sequence in which the essential truth 
and profundity of the human spirit rise from its transcendent ground 
- not without struggle and error, but with the necessary consistency 
of a development that has had a normal beginning. (Troeltsch 1991: 
27) 
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Thus, even though the historical method "relativizes everything," it does 
so "not in the sense that it eliminates every standard of judgement and 
necessari ly ends in a nihilistic skepticism, but rather in the sense that 
every historical structure and moment can be understood only in relation 
to others and ultimately to the total context." Furthermore, it asserts that 
"standards of values cannot be derived from isolated events but only from 
an overview of the historical totality." Most importantly, "it is impossible 
to arrive at some suprahistorical core" (Troeltsch 1991: 18). 
Yet the assertion that history can only "ultimately" be understood in 
relation to the "total" context implies that it cannot ever be fully under-
stood - except, perhaps, in the next life, the "supra-historical" to which 
we have no inviting access. How, then, can the fear of relativism be faced 
in such a profane (but baptized) world ? One way, the one that has shaped 
so much theological history, is by accepting the notion of unique revela-
tion, as defined by one's recognized authori ty, and then arguing over its 
meaning. Another way, not necessarily exclusive of the first, is by learning 
to swim with confidence. 
An elaboration upon the second alternative requires a return to Arnold 
Toynbee. Despite the sorry history he presents of so many Ozymandias's 
lying desolate in the shifting sands, his organized view of time leaves 
room for an overall optimism. Critics like Pitirim Sorokin, however, 
astutely note that supposedly inclusive "systematic" views like Toynbee's 
are inherently partial, inevitably biased, and finally dishonest to the human 
condition: 
Not only is the total civilization of such enormous 'culture-areas' 
as the Greco-Roman, or the Sinic, or of any other of his civi lizations 
not one whole or system, but the total civilization of even a smallest 
possible civilizational area - that of a single individual - is but a 
coexistence of several and different systems and congeries unrelated 
with one anoth er in any way except spatial adjacency in a biological 
organism. (Sorokin 1940: 189 -190) 
"Having mistakenly taken different congeries for system ... ", Sorokin 
writes, Toynbee comes up with "not so much a theory of civilizational 
change as much as an evaluative theory of civilizational progress or 
regress" (Sorokin 1940: 191). 
Thus, despite the massive scholarship and intimidating length of Toyn-
bee's study, Sorokin and others point out the shaping prejudices that no 
historian, no human being, can escape: our imaginations provide the 
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wonderfully creative and individually tailored selection that we each take 
from reality. The alternative to the fa lse confidence of a constructed view 
of Truth, therefore, is not the abandonment of systems, but a recognition 
of their inadequacy. Historical consciousness is not only a source for 
malaise, a misfiring of overloaded circuits. In the specific case that Sorokin 
discusses, for example, "quite a large number of Egyptiac or Babylonic 
or especia lly Hellenic cultural systems traits ... are very much alive as 
components of the contemporary Western or other cultures. And they are 
alive not as objects in a museum but as living realities in our and other 
cultures" (Sorokin 1940: 193) - in much the same way that Pilgrim's 
Progress and the story of Adam and Eve, threading their way through 
several of our chapters, speak anew (but differently) in each age. T he 
civilization in which they originated has collapsed, but the "artifacts" 
have not. 
The success one age may or may not have in retrieving the significance 
of that artifact will vary, as Christianity's experience with the Bible has 
repeatedly shown. But, as Hans-Georg Gadamer points out, "every en-
counter with tradition that takes place within historical consciousness 
involves the experience of the tension between the text ar:i.d the present . 
The hermeneutic task consists in not covering up this tension by attempt-
ing a naive assimilation but consciously bringing it out" (Gadamer 1975: 
273). In his analysis of this experience Gadamer is, in general, more 
optimistic than many. He writes, for example, that "in the process of 
understanding there takes place a real fusing of horizons, which means 
that as the historical horizon is projected, it is simultaneously removed" 
(Gadamer 1975: 273). 
But just how often does th is "process of understanding" take place? 
Since he imagines the "fusing of horizons" as a form of translation, it is 
not surprsing that Gadamer believes that 
the existence of literature in translation shows that something is 
presented in such works that is true and valid for all time. Thus it 
is by no means the case that world literature is an alienated fo rm 
of that which constitutes the mode of being of a work according to 
its original purpose. It is rather the historical mode of being of 
literature that makes it possible for something to belong to world 
literature. (Gadamer 1975: 144) 
Gadamer embraces the humanistic idea of a common human condition, 
one that can be shared if we only find the best tools for transla tion. On 
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this point, recent critics are skeptical, pointing to the experience of 
colonization as a demonstration that politics inevitably subvert the desired 
"fusion" (see N iranjana 1992, for example). In terms of a specifically 
religious imagination, this act of "translating" eternal truths from one 
culture (or time) to another has historically shared a great deal with the 
clumsiness, naivete, and cruelty of colonizers. 
Thus, "artifacts" is not a suitable term for the truths that can be shared 
across cultural or temporal borders. Happily, the tempered optimism of 
David Tracy seems more cognizant of the biological home in which our 
imaginations live, and in which they are shaped by emotions beyond our 
understanding or control. This is the condition touched upon by Sorokin 
and analyzed at length by Freud. "We begin to suspect," writes Tracy, 
that consciousness itself is radically intertextual. Perhaps it only 
seems this way because we will not face the dispossession of the 
ego by all the plural and ambiguous texts that have usurped its w ill 
to domination disguised as the self's will to truth. Reason can be 
so driven by a debilitating optimism that it will not dwell for long 
upon either the radical interruptions of history or the unconscious 
distortions of self and culture. It is not merely that reason will not 
sometimes stay for an answer, but that it will not even wait for a 
question. (Tracy 1987: 78) 
"Debilitating optimism" is a refreshingly iconoclastic description of the 
human tendency to shut down discussion when it frightens us. But is the 
alternative an "energizing pessimism"? Perhaps this would be another way 
to describe the skepticism which many today, leery of the forced march 
of institutionalized "truths" through our bloody history, have embraced 
with anger, resignation, or hope. What we have at work here is something 
far more profound, far less adolescent, than Swinburne's outrageous 
blasphemy in "Hymn to Proserpine": "Thou· hast conquered, 0 pale 
Galilean; the world has grown grey from thy breath." In the view of 
many, the world "will not even wait for [the] question" posed by the 
Galilean before marching off to foreclose in his name. Faced with this 
self-serving orthodoxy, many others happily allow the religious imagina-
tion to speak in unorthodox ways. 
If, as our writers here contend, theologizing is an act of imagination, 
and if, like any act of imagination, it is situated in, and thereby shaped 
by, its historical and social context, it follows that this social act has 
responsibilities both to the historical record and to the present. It is easy 
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enough to condemn sects that retreat to a mountaintop to await the 
world's. end; it is less simple to approach, with honesty, the shared 
limitations that plague our own theologies. It is with this recognition that 
Ernest Gellner, while ridicu ling the gnosticism of postmodernist jargon, 
endorses what he identifies as Enlightenment Rationalist Fundamentalism, 
which absolutizes no substantive convictions, but does absolutize some 
formal principles of knowledge, procedure, and moral valuation. 
Sounding more than a little like Voltaire, Gellner sets down as his 
manifesto the observation that "the world does not arrive as a package-
deal - which is the customary manner in which it appears in traditional 
cultures - but piecemeal. Strictly speaking, though it arrives as a package-
deal, it is dismembered by thought" (Gellner 1992: 80). Dismemberment 
is hardly an attractive term for the process, but it does take on a greater 
charm if one imagines pointing it in the d irection of some belief-system 
other than one's own; this, at least, has historically been a human tendency. 
But one can quickly see how apposite is Gellner's description of the 
process. Leaving very little to the reader's imagination, he proposes the 
following as the consequences of his approach: 
... it desacralizes, disestablishes, disenchants everything· substantive: 
no privileged facts, occasions, individuals, institutions or associa-
tions. In other words, no miracles, no divine interventions and 
conjuring performances and press conferences, no saviours, no sa-
cred churches or sacramental communities. All hypotheses are sub-
ject to scrutiny, all facts open to novel interpretations, and all facts 
subject to symmetrical laws which preclude the miraculous, the 
sacred occasion, the intrusion of the Other into the Mundane. 
(Gellner 1992: 81) 
Put this way, "Enlightenment Rationalist Fundamentalism" sounds a bit 
like a postmodern reversal of Coleridge - in effect, a perpetual suspension 
of belief - and one wonders whether or not any individual could have 
the purity of intention that seems to be required of this approach's 
devotees. Who wants to live in a desert, clean as it may be? Nonetheless, 
Gellner also offers a more nuanced characterization: 
It shares with monotheistic exclusive scriptural religion the belief in 
the existence of a unique truth, instead of an endless plurality of 
meaning-systems; but it repudiates the idea that this unique vision 
is related to a privileged Source, and could even be defi nitive. It 
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shares with hermeneutic relativism the repudiation of the claim that 
a substantive, final and definitive version of the truth is available. 
It is, however, separated from it by refusing to endorse, as equally 
valid, each pre-Enlightenment, socially enmeshed, cognitive cocoon 
of meanings.(Gellner 1992: 84) 
Thus, it is "absolutist and nonrelativistic in procedure, and permanently 
attentiste rather than relativist in its substantive, first-order conviction" 
(Gellner 1992: 80). Gellner seems to be positing the existence of objective 
truths - asserting a faith that provides a hopeful foundation for our life's 
search, even if we never encounter those truths in an ultimately convincing 
way. If this sounds like a reactionary enthronement of Reason, it should; 
when push comes to shove, in fact, Gellner hedges and suggests that the 
reader should not let this all become too abstract. "Societies," after all, 
"are systems of real constraints, operating in a unique nature, and must 
be understood as such, and not simply as systems of meaning" (Gellner 
1992: 95) - we do have to get on with life and act as if it all held together, 
at least for the moment, and at least for oneself. But we must always 
remain willing to "dismember" our perceptions when presented with new 
views. As unsatisfying as this blatant return to an Enlightenment pre-
postmodern world may be, it does have the appeal of clearing the decks 
and taking a fresh look at all preconceptions and constricted creeds, the 
debris of our dialectical history. It may also remind us of Karl Rahner's 
recommendation, mentioned early in this concluding chapter, that the 
believer "remain open to God's disposal" (Rahner 1983: 210) - which 
may, here, be a rather disturbing pun. 
More balanced, however, is David Tracy's suggestion that "to interpret 
well must now mean that we attend to and use the hermeneutics of both 
retrieval and suspicion" (Tracy 1987: 77). Retrieval does not demand the 
maintenance of oppressive institutional and interpretive structures. It does 
suggest, in fact, that Gadamer's notion of "fusion" is not without merit, 
especially if carried out with the suspicion so clearly defined by Gellner. 
As we have seen with Pitirim Sorokin, "civilizations" do not collapse and 
diappear as absolutely as Toynbee implied. But the ongoing evolution of 
a postmodern Christianity will necessarily be a patchwork affair rather 
than a monolithic structure or a monologic conversation. The chapters in 
this volume suggest that this has been the pattern for the development of 
Christianity: the religious imagination always implies a conversation. 
If, as David Tracy recognizes, "the spli t self of postmodernity is caught 
between conscious activity and a growing realization of the radical oth-
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erness not on ly around but within us" (Tracy 1987: 77), this does not 
mean that the alternative to "standing up for what we believe in" is a 
gutless surrender to someone else's imagination. Instead, "our theories 
and our conversations can become... what they in fact always were: 
limited, fragile, necessary exercises in reaching relatively adequate knowl-
edge of language and history alike" (Tracy 1987: 81). And this "relatively 
adequate knowledge" suggests Diana Eck's helpful distinction between 
relativism and pluralism. "For the nihilistic relativist," she writes, "the 
impossibility of universalizing any one truth claim suggests the emptiness 
of all truth claims" (Eck 1993: 194),- but 
the pluralist, on the other hand, stands in a particular community, 
even as restless critic. I would argue that there is no such thing as 
a generic pluralist. There are Christian pluralists, Hindu pluralists, 
and even avowedly humanistic pluralists - all daring to be them-
selves, not in isolation from but in relation to one another. Pluralists 
recognize that others also have communities and commitments. They 
are unafraid to encounter one another and realize that they must 
all live with each other's particularities. The challenge for the 
pluralist is commitment without dogmatism and community without 
communalism. The theological task, and the task. qf a pluralist 
society, is to create the space and the means for the encounter of 
commitments, not to neutralize all commitment. (Eck 1993: 195) 
It is in storytelling and in explaining ourselves to one another that this 
encounter of commitments continues co become possible, pointing toward 
that which remains transcendent. 
Notes 
1. Pelikan notes chat " ... history was assigned a lesser real ity than the superhis-
torica l rea lm, from which the truth of revelation was thought to have come. 
If the life and the structures of the Church were involved in the historical 
process, as no one cou ld deny that they were, one needed nevertheless to insist 
that the Church as such belonged to the transcendent order of real ity, despite 
its participation in the immanent order. So also, the doctrines of the Church 
had to be grounded in the 'really rea l' beyond history, even though they were 
regrettably historical, all too historical, in their genesis and development" 
(Pelikan 1971: 157). 
2. For more on chis topic, see, among others, Pelikan 1969: 12 - 24 and Crowley 
1992. 
238 john C. Hawley 
3. Yet he also ca lls Christianity "the supreme religious force of history" (Troeltsch 
1991: 26) and endorses an "inner" experience: in the person of Jesus "a God 
distinct from nature produced a personality superior to nature with eternally 
transcendent goals and the willpower to change the world. H erc a religious 
power manifests itself, which to anyone sensitive enough to catch its echo in 
one's own soul, seems to be the conclusion of all previous religious movements 
and the starting poin t of a new phase in the history of religion, in which 
nothing has yet emerged . Indeed, even for us today it is unth inkable that 
something higher sho uld emerge, no matter how many new forms and com-
binations this purely inward and persona l belief in God may yet enter" 
(Troeltsch 1991: 28). 
4. "It is important to recognize that the stories told by historians have a basic 
epistemological difference from literary fict ions. There is a specific external 
reference, an 'objectivity' which can be investigated, checked, cha llenged and 
modified. Historical accounts interlock like maps; t he discoveries of separate 
investigators can be combined. There is a fundamental simila rity in narrative 
mode but a fundamental difference in the object of 'reference' between the 
stories we call 'history' and those we call 'fiction"' (Wright 1988: 91). Gadamer, 
also, notes that "The difference between a litera ry work of art and any other 
literary text is not so fundamental ... thc essential d ifference of these various 
' languages' ... lies .. . in the distinction between the claims to truth t hat each 
makes. All literary works have a profound community in that the linguistic 
form makes effective the significance of the contents to be expressed. In t his 
light, the understanding of texts by, say, a histor ian is not so very different 
from the experience of art. And it is not mere chance that the concept of 
literature embraces not only works of literary art, but everything that has 
been transmitted in writing" (Gadamer 1975: 145) . Veeser, also, suggests that 
"every expressive act is embedded in a network of material practices," so that 
" literary and non-literary ' texts' circulate inseparably." But he goes further, 
and writes that " no discourse, imaginative or archival, gives access to un-
changing truths or expresses una lterable human nature" (Veeser 1989: Preface) . 
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